TORTS-MALICOUs PROSECUTION-CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERPETRATORS
OF CRIME TO THOSE WRONGFULLY PROSECUTED FOR SUCH CRIME-

Seidel v. Greenberg, 108 N.J. Super. 248, 260 A.2d 863 (L. Div.
1969).
Plaintiff was employed as credit manager and bookkeeper for a
corporation of which defendants were the principal stockholders and
principal officers. Defendants conspired with a third party, one Nathaniel Wallace, to burn the premises of the corporation and collect
the insurance thereon. Wallace subsequently procured a fourth party,
one Clarence Moore, to do the actual burning of the premises.' Following the fire, there apparently was a falling-out between defendants
and their co-conspirator, Wallace, over the division of the insurance
proceeds which culminated in a complaint to police by one of the
defendants that Wallace had threatened his life. Following his apprehension because of the complaint, Wallace disclosed the conspiracy
and also implicated plaintiff whom Wallace had observed in the
corporation offices 2 during one or more meetings held there in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Plaintiff, defendants, Wallace and Moore were "charged with
arson to defraud insurance companies and conspiracy to commit arson." 3 Charges against plaintiff and defendants subsequently were
dropped but Wallace and Moore were indicted and convicted. Approximately two years later, defendants also were indicted and convicted on four counts growing out of the incident, including conspiring
with Wallace and Moore to burn the premises and contents with
intent to defraud insurance companies.
After defendants' indictment, plaintiff instituted this action
against defendants complaining, inter alia,

that the Greenbergs [defendants] willfully and deliberately caused
the fire, as a result of which plaintiff was arrested on a warrant of
the Newark arson squad and charged with having
conspired with
4
defendants and others to have caused the fire.
I

Seidel v. Greenberg, 108 N.J. Super. 248, 250, 260 A.2d 863, 865 (L. Div. 1969).
2 Plaintiff's duties normally required his presence in the corporation's offices. Id. at
250-51, 260 A.2d at 865.
3 Id. at 251, 260 A.2d at 865.
4 Id. at 254, 260 A.2d at 866. The complaint also included counts essentially for negligence in starting the fire, willful and deliberate acts which in essence led to plaintiff's
prosecution, breach of an agreement to pay plaintiff's legal expenses in his earlier criminal
prosecution, and negligent or willful interference with prospective economic advantage.
Id. at 253-54, 260 A.2d at 866-67.

NOTES

In effect, this .part of plaintiff's claim was analogous to conventional
claims for malicious prosecution., The complaint alleged various injuries6 resulting from defendants' acts and prayed for both compensa7
tory and punitive damages.
In a trial without a jury, the court held:
[D]efendants are liable to plaintiff for the damages which he suffered because of his criminal prosecution. In effect, the holding of
the court is that they [defendants] are liable to him [plaintiff] for
malicious prosecution ....8
The court awarded plaintiff $10,000 with costs for compensatory damages but denied punitive damages. 9 No appeal from the decision of
the trial court was taken.' 0
Seidel is a case of first impression in New Jersey concerning the
civil liability of "perpetrators of a crime . . . to an innocent person
5 Elements required to support a malicious prosecution action are:
(a) institution or continuation of an original judicial proceeding, either civil or criminal, against plaintiff;
(b) institution of such proceeding by or at the instance of defendant;
(c) termination of such proceeding in plaintiff's favor;
(d) malice by defendant in instituting the original proceeding;
(e)lack of probable cause in instituting the original proceeding; and
(f) suffering of injury or damage by plaintiff as a result of the institution of the
original proceeding.
34 AM. JUR. Malicious Prosecution § 6 (1941); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 4 (1948).
6 Injuries usually alleged in malicious prosecution actions include:
(a) injury to plaintiff's reputation, standing and credit without actual proof of damages. Drakos v. Jones, 189 Okla. 593, 118 P.2d 388 (1941);
(b) humiliation, injury to feelings and mental suffering without actual proof of damages. Kirkpatrick v. Hollingsworth, 207 Okla. 292, 249 P.2d 434 (1952);
(c) injury from arrest or imprisonment. Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc., 199 Cal. 15,
247 P. 894 (1926); Tutton v. Olsen & Ebann, 251 Mich. 642, 232 N.W. 399 (1930);
and
(d) specific financial loss based on actual proof. H.S. Leyman Co. v. Short, 214 Ky.
272, 283 S.W. 96 (1926).
For an analysis of the types of harm which plaintiff must allege to maintain a malicious
prosecution action based on an original administrative proceeding, as distinguished from
a criminal proceeding, see 75 HARV. L. REV. 629 (1962).
7 Malicious prosecution is peculiarly subject to the award of punitive damages because of its intentional and outrageous character, especially where personal ill will or
oppressive conduct are involved. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Thomasson, 251 F. 833 (4th
Cir. 1918); Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 (L. Div. 1962); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. Wynne, 149 Va. 882, 141 S.E. 829 (1928).
8 108 N.J. Super. at 267, 260 A.2d at 875.
9 Since the court predicated its finding of proximate cause and the resulting liability
on defendants' degree of fault, i.e., intentional and aggravated acts, it is not understood
why the court did not award punitive damages. See note 7 supra.
10 Telephone interviews with Ashley Goodman, plaintiff's attorney, and Harvey Weissbard, defendants' attorney, June 30, 1970.
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who was . . .subjected to criminal prosecution for ... such crime""
without some affirmative action or participation of the perpetrators
in such prosecution. In fact, Seidel is noteworthy in that no direct
precedent for this action was found in any jurisdiction.
As was recognized by the court, actions for malicious prosecution
are not favored 12 because of their potential for discouraging citizens

from disclosing information to law enforcement officers for fear of
civil suits. Consequently, in order to make actions for malicious prosecution more difficult to maintain, plaintiff has the burden of proving
all of the elements' 3 of the action.
Seidel was primarily concerned with the question of who may be
held liable in a malicious prosecution action; or stated otherwise, who
may be charged with the institution of the original proceeding 14 from
which the malicious prosecution action arose. This question can be
answered readily in many malicious prosecution actions because it can
be established that defendant swore out the warrant in an earlier
15
criminal proceeding or was the plaintiff in an earlier civil action.
108 N.J. Super. at 250, 260 A.2d at 864.
Id. at 257, 260 A.2d at 868. See Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 165 P. 318 (1917);
Schubkegel v. Gordino, 56 Cal. App. 2d 667, 133 P.2d 475 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Renda v.
International Union, UAW, 366 Mich. 58, 114 N.W.2d 343 (1962).
13 See note 5 supra. One of the elements most difficult to prove is that of lack of
probable cause in initiating the original proceeding. Probable cause is "a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent man in believing the party is guilty of the offense." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 860 (3d ed. 1964). Probable cause is almost always found where the prosecution was initiated with the advice of counsel. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1215 (1950). For
a discussion of the effects of defects in the original complaint on a later action for
malicious prosecution, see Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 786 (1954). For a discussion of liability
for malicious prosecution of plaintiff who was mistakenly identified as one who committed
an offense, see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1955).
14 See note 5 supra.
15 One who wrongfully procures initiation of proceedings is liable to the same extent
as the one who actually initiates such proceedings. Security Underground Storage, Inc. v.
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1965). However, if defendant did not swear out the
warrant which initiated the original proceeding, he can only be held liable for malicious
prosecution if he voluntarily aided and assisted in its prosecution. Fertitta v. Herndon,
175 Md. 560, 3 A.2d 502 (1939); Atkinson v. Birmingham, 44 R.I. 123, 116 A. 205 (1922);
Gibson v. Brown, 245 S.C. 547, 141 S.E.2d 653 (1965). In the case of Soule v. Winslow, 66
Me. 447 (1876), defendant was held not liable for malicious prosecution even though he
had been the nominal plaintiff as next friend of a minor in the original proceeding.
Questions concerning the vicarious liability of defendant because of the acts of his
partner or employee in initiating the original proceeding frequently arise. In regard to
cases involving partnerships, the general rule is that a malicious prosecution is not within
the scope of a partnership. Thus, mere knowledge of a partner's acts will not create
liability, but rather consent of such character as to amount to advice and cooperation is
required for liability. In cases involving a master-servant relationship, the master is liable
for malicious prosecution arising from acts of the servant only if such acts are specifically
11
12
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The question becomes more difficult where the original proceeding
was actually initiated by a public official based on information supplied by defendant.' 6 This question of liability was particularly difficult in Seidel because the original proceeding had been initiated by
police without any participation, including furnishing of information,
by defendant.
The "normal"' 7 rule in malicious prosecution actions similar to
that herein is that:
In order to charge a private person with responsibility for the
initiation of proceedings by a public official, it must . . . appear

that his desire to have the proceedings initiated expressed by direction, request, or pressure of any kind was the determining factor
in the official's decision to commence the prosecution or that the
information furnished by him upon which the official acted was
known to be false.18

A mere passive knowledge of the acts of someone, for whom defendant
is not otherwise responsible,' is not sufficient to place liability upon
defendant in an action for malicious prosecution. There must be some
affirmative action by defendant in instituting or maintaining the
20
original proceeding before liability can be imposed on him.
The court in Seidel did not follow the "normal" rule for malicious
prosecution cases ostensibly because defendants were the perpetrators
of the crime for which plaintiff was prosecuted. 21 Forsaking the relatively objective test outlined by the "normal" rule in determining if
directed, are within the scope of the servant's employment, or are subsequently ratified by
the master. Silent acquiescence and retention of the servant in employment are not normally sufficient for liability of the master. Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1322 (1939).
16 Where a full and frank disclosure of facts is made by a defendant to a public
official who makes an independent judgment thereon and subsequently initiates proceedings, defendant is shielded from liability for malicious prosecution. Seelig v. Harvard
Co-op Soc., 355 Mass. 532, 246 N.E.2d 642 (1969); Renda v. International Union, UAW,
366 Mich. 58, 114 N.W.2d 343 (1962); Klein v. Elliot, 436 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1968); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 786 (1954). However, if defendant knowingly gives false information, withholds part of the information, or actively induces or persuades prosecution
such that the public official does not make an independent decision, defendant may be
liable. White v. Chicago, B.&Q.R.R., 417 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1969); Humbert v. Knutson,
224 Ore. 133, 354 P.2d 826 (1960).
17 The rule appears to be universal as no different authority was found in any jurisdiction.
18 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 653, comment g at 387 (1938); see also Humbert v. Knut-

son, 224 Ore. 133, 354 P.2d 826 (1960).
19 See note 15 supra, for discussion of liability of defendant for acts of others for
whom defendant may be responsible.
20 Gowin v. Heider, 237 Ore. 266, 386 P.2d 1 (1963); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1322 (1939).
21 108 N.J. Super. at 257, 260 A.2d at 869.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:276

defendants were actively instrumental in putting the original proceeding in motion, the court took a more subjective approach in determining if defendants' acts were the "proximate and efficient cause" of
the original criminal proceeding against plaintiff. The court stated
that where intentional acts are involved as herein, the rules of causation are applied more liberally, resulting in extended liability.2 2 The

court stated that once causation in fact has been established for intentional acts such as herein, concepts of fairness, justice, and policy
are entitled to more weight than the concept of "foreseeability" in
determining proximate causation and subsequent liability. 23 Applying

these concepts, the court held that defendants' acts were the proximate
cause of plaintiff's wrongful criminal prosecution, and thus defendants
were liable for malicious prosecution. The intervening acts of the
prosecuting authorities and co-conspirator in accusing plaintiff did not
24
relieve defendants of liability.

It is difficult to dispute the court's arguments that defendants'
acts were a "proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries since they are
based largely on concepts of fairness, justice and policy. However,
Seidel has gone well beyond established precedent regarding persons
who may be liable in malicious prosecution actions. While the court
is correct in stating that no precedent has been found which would
deny relief in a case such as Seidel,25 it should also be emphasized that
no precedent was found which would justify such a substantial departure from the universal rule requiring some active participationby
defendant before liability is imposed.
It appears that the only possible way Seidel can be reconciled
with the clear weight of precedent is by charging defendants with
"vicarious active participation" in initiating the original proceeding
because of the acts of their co-conspirator. All those who actively take
part in the pursuance of a common plan to commit a tortious or
criminal act are equally liable for the damage inflicted by one tortfeasor or criminal even though that damage exceeds what might rea22 Id. at 261-62, 260 A.2d at 871-73. See Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting
Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586 (1933); 14 STAN. L. REv. 362 (1962) indicating
that the standards utilized for proximate cause in intentional torts should be the same as
those utilized in negligence cases.
23 108 N.J. Super. at 266, 260 A.2d at 874. See Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69,
222 A.2d 513 (1966); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Menth v.
Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950), for views of the importance of concepts such
as fairness, justice and policy in determining liability.
24 108 N.J. Super. at 265, 260 A.2d at 873.
25 Id. at 257, 260 A.2d at 868.
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sonably have been foreseen. 26 Thus in Seidel, defendants might be
chargeable with the acts of their co-conspirator in apparently furnishing information to police which he did not know to be true and
which set in motion the criminal proceedings against plaintiff.27 This
"vicarious active participation" might lead to liability under the
"normal" rule for liability in malicious prosecution actions. However,
it appears that testimony involving the accusation of plaintiff by the
co-conspirator was not admitted into evidence. 28 Thus, even this possible way of reconciling Seidel with precedent by charging defendants
with "vicarious active participation" is not justified.
The only basis remaining for holding defendants liable was their
criminal conduct. To disregard the "normal" rule because defendants
were the perpetrators of the crime for which plaintiff was prosecuted
and to hold defendants liable for mere passive knowledge and failure
to take action to establish plaintiff's innocence by remaining silent
raises a fundamental question regarding violation of defendants' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 29 The court mentioned

this issue but expressed no opinion on the point.30
Another fundamental question raised by the court's holding, but
not considered by the court, concerns the use of tort law to punish
criminal conduct. 31 Further, the holding of the court in Seidel will
make the civil liability of one guilty of criminal conduct directly
dependent upon the efficiency and accuracy of the police in investigating information before initiating criminal proceedings. Such a situation should be avoided unless required by overriding policy considerations which are not found in Seidel. Compensating plaintiff for
damages resulting from his unjustified criminal prosecution is a
worthy goal. However, this goal should not be attained by disregarding defendants' fundamental rights or making defendants' liability
dependent upon the efficiency with which public officials perform their
duties. It is believed that Seidel went too far in attempting to balance
justice, fairness, and policy considerations against those underlying
restrictions on malicious prosecution actions.
Alvin D. Hooper
26 Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1950). See Griffin v. Clark,
55 Idaho 364, 42 P.2d 297 (1935).
27 108 N.J. Super. at 251 n.1, 260 A.2d at 865 n.l.
28
29

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

80 108 N.J. Super. at 270 n.2, 260 A.2d at 876 n.2.
31

See 14

STAN.

L. REv. 362, 364-65 (1962).

